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£,:ATUTES AND CON:'i' ITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS

IC 35-27-2-1 (1971), Eur:.w Ind. Sta.t. Antk. §10-1510 (1971 Supp .)
~fuoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly
manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noiss, or by tumul tuous or offensive behavior, t:.hreatening, traducing,
quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, shall be
deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction
shall be fined in ::..ny su.m not cxc.eediv.g five hundred dollars
[ $500] to which may be add0d imprisonment for not to e,:ceed
one hundred eighty [180] d:-1.ys. 11
11

Relevant portions of the Constitution of the State of Indiana
are as follows:
Article I, Section 9 - 11No law sha ll be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought a~1d opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any
subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every
person shall be respor..sibla. 1 1
Article I, Section 12 - ''All courts shall be open; and
every man, for injury don,~ to him in his person, property,
or reputation , shall h2ve remedy by due course of law.
Justice shall be administ~red freely, and without purchase;
completely and withou·t denial ; speedily, and witho~t delay."
Article I, Section 13 - "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have t:h~ right to a public tr5.al, by an
impartial jury, in t:he .;.:ounty in which the offense shall
have been committed ; i.:o be heard by h:imself: and counsel; ::to,
·.dema11,d the -n·a t.ur~ · an,-1 .:crrus~ of· the ·.a·ccltsatio1.1. a·gai11st· hitt11
and: t~have a· copy thereof; to •meet .the witnesses - face to~· ·
face, and to have compulscLy process for obtaining witnesses
i11 his · · fav.or ♦- 11,

·Ar:ti.cle. I, : Section . 31 - 1!No ·-iaw shall rest:ra'in :any of
:_the:: inhab.itant·.$ : of 1.t:h.e State _from ·a ssembling' toge ther .in:. a
:p·eaceab le .manner, to· ·Qorisult fo~ the:iii- common .good; nor from
instructing their representatives ; nor from applying to the
·c:e.ner~a·l: .Assemply· for ;r ·e dress of grievances. II
Re'levant:.por.ti-ons · :of the Constitution of the United States

are as follows:
Arr.endmeut 1 - "Congress :i~1all mal<e no lei, respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

-2. .•

thereof; or abridging th~ free dom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people paaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a red1:e ss of grievances . "
Amendment 14 - "All peroons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United St<ltes and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enfori.::e any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state dep;:ive any person of
life, liberty, or property, ·without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the eq~al protection of the laws."

-- 3 -

I~:su~s P:t·C:lsent:od On Appe ~l

1.

Hhether the Discrde rlj• Con.duct Statute, IC 35-27-2 - 1

(1971), Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.

§

10-1510 (Supp. 1971) , es applied

to appellant's conduct, which cc,r.sisted of speech per~, violates
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of India na,
and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States of A~erica.

2.

Whether, as a matter of law, the evidence presented on

behalf of the State is sufficient to estsblish beyond a reasonable
doubt all the eleme nts of proof necessary to sustain a conviction
of disorderly conduct under IC 35- 27-2-1 (1971), Burns Ind. Stat.

Ann.

§

10-1510 (Supp. 1971).
3.

Whether the Disorderly Conduct Statute. IC 35-37-2-1

(1971). Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.

§

10-1510 (Supp. 1971). is unconsti-

tutional and voi d on its face for vagueness and overbreadth in
violation of Article

r.

Sections 9 and 31 of the Constitution of

the State of Indiana, and the First ~nd Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States of America.
4.

Whether the form ( "boilerplate") affidavits utilized by

the Monroe County Prosecutor for the ini tiation of prosecutions
for disorderly conduct and whi ch do not state the specific nature
of the defendant's conduct, but instead charge all persons
accused of disorderly conduct wi th all of the forty-eight to fiftyone combinations of disorderly conduct proscribed by Section 10-1510,
are inadequate to give the accused, the trial court and the triers
of fact notice of the offense charged and of the issues to be

tried as required by Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of
the State of Indiana, and i:i1e <.foZ: p:co<:ess clause of th~ Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of t'b.e Unitad Stutes.

STATENEN'r OF TEE CASE
This is an appeal £rem a conviction of disord~rly conduct
IC 35-27--2-1 (1971), Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.

§

10-1510 (Supp . 1971),

(hereinafter cited as Section 10-1510), based upon the finding of
the Monroe Superior Court that the appellant uttered the phrase:
11

We ' 11 take the fucking street later [ agninl , " during a disturbance

near the campus of IndianR University in Bloomington, Indiana, on
May 13, 1970.
In an affidavit filed in the City Court of Bloomington on
May 14 , 1970, appellant wc.s charged es follows:
''The undersigned , being duly sworn on information and
belief, says that at and in the County of Monroe and State
of Indiana, to wit: 100 block of South Indiana Avenue en
the 13~h day of May , 1970, one Gregory Hess late of said
County, did then and there u.nlewfully: act in a loud,
boisterous and disorder.ly manner so as to distur~ the peace
and quiet of the (household) and (neighborhood) in and
around the a forementioned place by loud and unusual noise,
and by tumultuous and offensive behavior, threatening, traducing,
quarreling, challenging to fight and fighting contrary to
the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana."
On May 28, 1970, appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion

to Quash the aforementioned affidavit with a supporting memorandum
attached.

The Motion to Quash challenged the affidavit on the

grounds that (1) the offense of disorderly conduct was not stated
with sufficient certainty; (2) the facts stated in the affidavit did
not constitute a public offense in that (a) Section 10-1510 is
unconstitutional on its face because it is impermissibly vague and
overly broad, (b) the affidavit did not allege that appellant's
conduct tended to provoke a breach of the peace, a.nd (c) the affidavit

,,.

··o ··

did n.ot include an all.ag.~ 'i:ion o::: r~ans r ea .

Appellant's motion was

accompe.nied by an exten.3i\"':'J memor udu111 of law ins pport of the
Motion to Quash.

Record Ptl. 7- 19.

The State did not r e spond to eppellnnt's Motion to Quash and~
without explanation, the City Court judge overruled the motion ~n

June 3, 1970.

Appellant entered a plea cf not. guilty on June 12, 1970,

and the ca.use was tried without a jury in City Court

1970.

Oi.l

0ctoh~r 29,

Appellant was found guilty on the same date and was assessed

a fine of $25.00 ond co sts of $24.00.

On November 23, 1910, the appellant filed a notice of appeal
and the cause was transferred to Monroe Superior Court for trial
§_~ ~ -

Cash bond of $100 was s e t by thA City C01.1.rt and was

posted by the appellant .

Appella~t requested a jury trial.

The ca.use was on June 3, 1971, submitted to the Monroe
Superior Court on a stipulated record and in appellant's Memor~ndum
in Support of Appeal the issues l·! ere formulated es follo~·7S:

"A. Whether the City Court judge properly overruled
the defandant's mo~ion to quash the affidavit ou the ground
that it did not st ate the offense with sufficient certainty,
and that the affidavit did not state a public offense.

B. Whether, even if constitutional on its face, the
disorderly conduct statute [section 10-1510] is being unconstitutionally applied in this case. 11 Record p. 6.
Appellant on June 18, 1971, filed an extensive memorandum of
points and authorities in support of his position.

Record pp. 20-30 .

On July 14, 1971, the State filed a half-page ar..swer to the memorandum asserting merely tbat the notion to Quash had been proparly
overruled in the City Court end that Section 10-1510 had not been
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applied unconstitutionally in a~:-.pcllant's case.
cited in support of the~e ccnclu.,;ions.

No authority we.s

Record p. 31.

On July 19, 1971, without ruling separately on appellant's

Motion to Quash, the Monroe Superior Court ent.ered judgment egainst

the appellant as follows:
"This cause having been submitted to this Court for
trial on Stipulated Faces agreed to by the defendant and the
State of Indiana, and the Cou.:t having examined the Memoranda
of counsel and now being duly advised in the premises,
now finds the defendant guilty of the charge of Disorderly
Conduct (Burns Ind. Stetutes Annotated, Section 10-1510)
and, the Court having fol:nd the defendant guilt.:y as che1:ged,
now assesses a. fine of $L 00, plus the coets of this action
and the defendant is now gre.nted sixty (60) days to pay said
fine and costs, ea assessed, or in lieu thereof, to file
his Motion to Correct Errors. JUDGNENT· . 11
The trial judge did not include with his judgment any findi1.1.gs of
£act or any interpretation of Secticn 10-1510.

On July 22, 1971, appellant f iled a Motion for Clarification
of Judgment noting that

"At no time in these proceedings has the State respon<led
substz.ntively to the po in.ts made by the defendant:, and
neither the City Court nor this Court has offered auy
reasons for finding that the State's pleading was legally
sufficient; that the disorderly conduct statute is constitutional on its face ; 2.nd that the said statute was
applied constitutional ly in the i nstant case.
"The clarification hereby requested is important to
counsel's preparation of a motion to correct errors and any
subsequent appeal that may become necessary.
"Counsel would welcome the Court's advice as to the
basis upon which this conviction was upheld in light of the
authorities discussed in the memoranda filed herein and in
light of the absence of authority offered by ths State or
by this Court for sustaining the conviction herain."

The court not having respoo.ded to the above-quoted motion by
September 16, 1971, appella11t on that date filed bis Motion to
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Correct Errors allaging: (1) that the Court e17red in overruling
appellant's Motion to Quash in light of the grou~cis stated therein
and supported by the memorandum of points and authorities; (2) that
the verdict and judgment are contrary to law in that Section 101510 is unconstitutional on its face because it is overbroad and
vague; (3) that Section 10 -1510 is unconstitutional as applied
to the appellant; and (4) that tha verdict and judgment were not
supported by sufficient evidence upon all necessary elements of
the offense.

Record p. 33.

A memorandum was attached to the Motion to Correct E~rors

supporting the motion and incorporating by reference the memoranda
previously filed by the appelb.nt in support of his Motion to
Quash and in support of his arguments on the merits.

Record p. 37.

Without waiting for a response from the State, the court
on September 22, 1971, overruled appellant's Motion to Correct
Errors and entered the following order:
''Defendant's motion to correct errors is now overruled
by the Court; and in response to the motion for clarification
of judgment filed by the defendant's attorney, the Court now
advises the defendant's attorney that the statement made
by the defendant shortly betore his arrest: 1~Je 1 ll take
the fucking street later (or e.gain) 11 is a statement that has
a tendency to lead to violence and is in violation of the
disorderly statute of the State of Indiana regardless of
whether or not the vulgar modifier was used in said state··
ment. 11
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the record
of proceedings was filed with the Supreme Court of Indiana on
December 17, 1971.
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FACTD
The facts as etipulated be low are a s follows:
At approximately 12 :30 p.tn. on May 13, 1970, units of the
Monroe County Sheriff's Department and the Bloomington City Police
were summoned to the Indiana. Avenue side of Br yan Rall which is
located on the western edge of t h~ c ampus of Indiana University
between East 4th Street and Kirlt'<-1ood Avenue withi n the city of
Bloomington, Monroe County, Indiana.

The Sheriff's Department and

the Bloomington Police Department had been requested to ass i ~t
University officials and campus police in removing certain demonstrators who had been blocking the doorways to Bryan Ha ll in conj unction with protests against the war in Indochina .
Monroe County Sheriff Cliffor d Thrasher arrived with
several of his deputies al: e.bout 12:30 p.m .

By the time the Sheriff

and his deputies arrived there were approxi mately 200-300 persons
assembled in front of Bryan Hall.

t-nlile clearing the front steps of

Bryan Hall, Bloomington City Police arr~sted one student for dis orderly conduct ; a second student was arrested near the p2trol
car in which the first ar-.cested student ba d bee n placed.

These

arrests occurred at approxim3tely 1:00 p .m.
In apparent response to the se arrests, about 100-150 of the
persons who had gather ed as spectator s want into Indiana Avenue in

front of Bryan Hall and in front of tlie patrol car in which the two
arrestees had been placed.

The persons wer e directed by university

and pol ice officials to clear the street to permit passage of the

patrol car and other traffic.

When they d i d not r espond to verbal
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directions. Sheriff Th?:ashei.· and his deputies began ·walking north
on Indiana Avenue from 4th Strea t tow~rd Kirkwood Avenue to clear
the stree t for automobile traffic.

The persons who were in the

street then moved to the curbs on either side of Indiana Avenue,
joining the large number of spectators that h,g_d gathe red along
both sides of the street.
After the street had been cleared a-o.d as he wa s pe.ssir.g

along the east curb of Indi ana Avenue near the front entrance to Bryan
Hall, Sheriff Thrasher arrested the defendant, Gregory Hess, for
disorderly conduct.

The evidence presented in City Court established

that Hess was standing off the street on the eastern curb of Indiana
Avenue slightly to the north of the t-1alkway leading to the fron::
entrance of Bryan Hall (which entrance had by this time been cleared

of any obstructions).
Hess

According to Sheriff Thrasher 9 he heard

use the word "fuck" in a loud voice and he immediately arrested

him for d i sorderly conduct.

He said that this was the first time

he had heard that word used on the particular occasion.

The evidence presented in City Court established (and Judge
Davi d McCrea found as a ms.tter of fact) that Hess used the phrase:

''We'll take the fucking street a gain," or:
fucking street later. "

"We'll take the

Two female witnesses, Bernice Slutsky and

Lela Donnelly (both students at Indiana University), were in the
immediate vicinity.

They testified that they heard Hess use the

phrase (i.e.~ with the word

ft.cking 11 modifying stree t) and witnessed

11

Hess' immediate arrest; t hat Hess spoke in a loud voice, but not any
louder than the other persons around them; that they were not

~.,
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offended by Hess' use of the word "fucking"; that many other people
in the crowd were using thst and similar words before and after
the Hess arrest; that Hess did not appear to be exhorting the
crowd to go back into the street; that he was facing the crowd and
not the street when he uttered the phrase; and t hat his s tatement
did not appear to be addressed to any particular person or group.
Dr. Owen Thomas, Professor of English at Indiana University,
testified as an expert witness on language usage, and English slang
usage in particular.

He testified that the word "fuck" has, in

various forms , been a part of the English l a nguage for hundreds
of years; that the word (or derivations of the word) is used in many contexts _f or manY,. p.urpos·~.s; •that- its :use as -a me t hod of denoting sexual intercourse is limited and that it is more commonly used as an explet i ve
to show disgust, to relieve tension, to shock others, or to demonstrate group identification or membership.

He mas of the opinion

that such express ion does not reflect a particularly imaginative
use of language.

He noted that the use of tbe word is not con-

sidered particularly offensive among c e rtain groups, such as
college students.

He did acknowledge, however, that the majority

of the citizens in the Bloomington community would consider the
express ion used by Mr . Hess to be offensive, but tha t he did not
believe that it would hav~ been offensive to persons in the crowd
in front of Bryan Hall in the particular c i rcumstances.

Dr . Thomas

added that in such circums tances use of the word alone or in a
phras e such as tha t uttered by Hess may serve as a means of avoiding
the acting out of feelings.

In other words, such an ~xpression

-12may function as a

11

safety valve 11 by which the speaker may avoid

violent or other antisocial behavior.

Dr. Thomas also testified

that the use of the wordJeither alone or in a phrase such as that
uttered by Hes~, n:ay be the person's way of identifying himself with
one group of persons and disaosociating~ himself -from another_ g~p_u p.
That is, the phrase used by Hess may have been his way of signify ..
ing his identification with the persons who had gathered in the
street and his opposition to what Sheriff Thrasher and his deputies
were doing in clearing the street.
Sheriff Thrasher testified that he t.1as offended by Hess'
expression, and that he did not interpret the expression as being
directed personally at him.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's conclusion that, with or without the vulgar
modifier, appellant's statement ''has a tendency to lead to violence"
and therefore violated Section 10-1510 reflects an unconstitutional
application of the statute to appellant's conduct.

Since speech

per~~ is the basis for the conviction, the court would have had
to determine that, under the circumstances, such speech fell outside
the protections of the First Amendment.
Since the court was concerned with the violence-producing
potential of the appellant's words, the standard by which such potential must be measured under the First Amendment is that of
"clear and present danger."

In other words, for the court lawfully

to have found appellant's speech to fall within the proscriptions
of the disorderly conduct statute, the record would have to support
a finding that sppellant's stat~ment (1) was directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action, and (2) was likely to incite
or produce such action.

The court applied the wrong legal standard

and this alone should lead to reversal of appellant's conviction.
Moreover, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction
for disorderly conduct.

The appellant's phrase:

"We ' ll take the

fucking street later (or again)" itself bel ies any imminent danger.
Also, the record shows that, under the circumstances, appellant 1 s
statement carried not the slightest risk of producing any lawless
action by others.

In addition, the Sheriff made his decision to

arrest appellant not on the basis of the danger potential of the
appellant ' s statement, but because he heard the single word "fuck."

-14.Apart from the "clear and prese nt danger" standard, the only
other situations in which criminal sanctions may be applied to speech
are where (1) speech is obscene (clearly appellant's phrase would not
have aroused anyone's prurient inter est); (2) speech amounts to
11

fighting words" (the record established that appellant's words

were not directed toward any person, and no one, including the
Sheriff, was in any way angered by the statement); or (3) speP-ch
amounts to a public nuisance by invading privacy interests in a
substantially intolerable manner (the circumstances as outlined in
the statement of facts do not

permit any such finding in this

case).
Excluding constitutional considerations, ~he evidence in the
instant case was insufficient to support a finding on all the
essential elements of disorderly conduct.

This Court recently has

emphasized that, for purposes of Section 10·-1510, conduct must be
analyzed in context.

Here the record shows that appellant (1)

spoke no louder than anyone else in the crowd ; (2) at the time of
his statement he was standing lawfully on the curb; (3) that the
"neighborhood II had been disturbed by Geveral events long before
his statement; (4) that no one,

sttve

the Sheriff, took any offense.

Under the circumstances, appellant's speech did not disturb, nor by
its nature would it have disturbed, the neighborhood around Bryan
Hall on the date and at the time in question.
Section 10-1510 is also void on its face due to overbreadth
and vagueness.

Under this statute a person may be found guilty of

disorderly conduct in forty-eight to fifty-one different ways.

The

statute, inter ~ , proscribes acting in a :'disorderly manner so as
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to disturb the peace and quiet of a neighborhood . • • by unusual
noise" or by "offensive behavior."
precise definition.

These terms are in.capable of

There are no standards, either in the statute

or in the decisions of this Court, by which a policeman may determine
whether a person is "disorderly" or making "u11usual noise. 11

Such

lack of specificity invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
not subject to meaningful cor.trol by trial and appellate courts.
Also, there is nothing in the statute that would prevent its
application to constitutionally protected activity such as speech
that may, by some standard known only to a particular police officer,
be deemed

11

offensive 11 or "unusual."

Section 10-1510 furnishes a

ready vehicle for the suppression of free speech.

It creates an

impermissible :'chilling 11 effect on the exercise of rights under
the First Amendment and is unconstitutional on its face.
Finally, the "boilerplate" pleadings &n:ployed by -the • State
to initiate disorderly conduct prosecutions in Monroe County do not
give accused persons

adeqllate·

notice of the charges against them.

Due to the multiple combinations of disorderly conduct possible
under Section 10-1510, a pleading which merely charges an accused
with all combinations under the statute violates a fundamental
principle of due process of law-i.e., such an affidavit cannot
possibly give adequate notice of the charges.

The State's pleading

is tantamount to handing a person forty-eight (or fifty-one) separate
statutes and asking him to guess which one (or which combination) the
State will seek to invoke at trial.

Such pleadings are obviously

defective and the appellant's Motion to Quash should have been sustained.
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ARGUl1ENT

I

Section 10-1510 is Unconstitutional As Applied to the Appellant.
It is important at the outset to note that in light of the

trial court's response to his Motion for Clarif~cation ~~Judgment,
appellant's conviction reets on speech I?..~~, i.e.,

his use of the

phrase ' 'We' 11 take the fucking street later (or again)" in the context of the situation existing at the tima of his arrest.

Quite

recently the Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion to
review and re-emphasize the limited circumstances in which governmental interests in the meintenauce of public order may outweigh
the individual's right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution. of the United States.

Co"hen v. California

(197~) 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d . 233.
As summarized in Cohen, a person may not be subjected to
criminal sanction for his oral or written remarks unless his speech:
(1) is obscene within the standard of Roth v. United States (1957) .,

354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498; (2) amounts to

11

fighting

words" within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, (1942)

315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 ( and as explained in
~ , 403 U.S. at 20); (3) amounts to a public nuisance in that
"substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner • . . . " 403 U.S. at 21; l] or (4) advocates law
violation or use of force and "is directed to in~iting or producing

1

Cf. Williams v. District of Columbia, (1969) 419 F.2d 638,
646 (D.C. Cir.).

imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.

II

Brendenburp; v~ Ohic.?,, (1969) 395 U.S. 4'-~4, 447-48,

89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829-30, 23 L.Ed.2d 430, 434.

See also Terminiello

v. City of Chicago, (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S,Ct. 894, 896, 93
L.Ed. 1131, 1134 (to sustain a conviction spezch must be shown
irlikely to produce a clear and p1·esent danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest.").

The latter of these criteria assumes major importance on
this appeal since the trial court found that appellant's st~tement
"has a tendency to lead to violence" regardless of use of the word
"fucking." (Emphasis supplied) . Unless the record shows the State
has met its burden of showing that appellant's words constituted a
"clear and present danger" within the meaning of the Brandenburg
standard, his conviction cannot be sustained. 21 It will be demonstrated below that the court did not apply the correct constitutional
standard.
Although the trial court's response to appellant's motion for
clarification necessarily implies a finding that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of guilt on any other statutory
or constitutional ground, appellant will demonstrate that there is
absolutely no legal basis upon which his conviction of disorderly
conduct can be affirmed by this Court.
2

Moreover, the trial court's use of the present tense ("has")
an~ the finding as to the irrelevance of the vulgar modifier suggests
a conclusion that the utterance of the phrase ''We 1 ll take the street
later (or again)~' is sufficient to bring the appellant's speech
within the disorderly conduct statute without regard to the circumstances.
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A.

The Trial Court's Finding That Appellant's Statement "Has a

Tendency to Lead to Violenc.::: 11 Is N?t Adequate to Sustain A Conviction
for Disorderly Conduct In View of the Constitutional Stendard
Requiring Proof of "Clear and Present Danger."
The trial court's finding that the appellant's statement
"has a tendency to lead to violence 11 reflects this Court's dictum in

Whited v. State, (1971)

--- Ind. --- ,

269 N.E.2d 149, 152 that:

"[D]ue to First Amendment freedoms a statute such as the
one here in question must be read to require that any
prohibited speech related activity must be proscribed
because it ~ ~ tendency ~ lead to v:tolence ." (Emphasis
by the Court.)
The dictum cannot, standing alone, be accepted as an accurate state-

ment of First Amendment standards.

Fir.st, the quoted language is

premised upon the Court's acceptance of the constitutional analysis
expressed in Williams v. District of Columbi~, 419 F.2d 638, 646

(D.C. Cir. 1969):

"[A] breach of the peace is threatened either

because the language creates a substantial risk of provoking violence,
or because it is, by 'contei:iporary community standardo :, ! ·so••gross ly
offensive to members of the public who actually overhear it as to
amount to a nuisance."

(Emphasis supplied).

Second, both Whited

and Williams are limited by the constitutional principle that before
the State may impose criminal sanctions for the· type of utterance
here involved it must show that appellant's statement was "likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
Terminiello v. pity of Chicago, (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 4 1 69 S.Ct. 894,

896, 93 L.Ed. 1131, 1134.

More recently the Supreme Court has re-

stated the applicable test as follows:

"[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a Sta.te to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of. law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to incitin& ~ producing imminent law~ action and is likely t(! incite .2E_ produce such action.
A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly
intrudes upon the freedom guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation
speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental
control."
Brandenburg v. Qh!.Q_, (1969) 395 U.S. , 444, 447--48, 89 S.Ct. 1827,
1829-30, 23 L.Ed.2d 430, 434 (emphasis supplied).

Likewise , any

application of a statute such as Section 10-1510 without proper regard
to this standard is unconstitutional.
The trial court's finding suggests that the mere ,us·e

~or ,;the

words by the appellant would have a tendency to lead to ~;··:., -lence.
But a finding of mere ntendency", even if i!: could be supported by
the evidence, would be insufficient to overcome the appellant's
rights under the First Amendment.

Bridges v. California, (1941)

314 U.S. 252,273, 62 S.Ct. J.90, 198, 86 L.Ed. 192,208;

"[N]iether

~nherent tendency nor 'reasonable tendency' [to bring about a
substantive evil] is enough to justify a restriction of free expression."
In order to sustain a conviction under the danger standard
when, as here, the conduct alleged to be criminal is speech eer ~.
the State must show (1) that appellant advocated use of force or
law violation; and (2) that such advocacy was directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action; and (3) that such advocacy
was likely to produce such action under the circumstances.

A failure

of proof on any£~ of these elements must lead to reversal of
appellant's conviction.
As to the first element, the appellant's statement,

11

We'll
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take the fucking street later (or again)" was uttered in an emotive
sense rather than as an incitement of o·thers to go back into the
streetin.vi olation of police orders .

It was, at most, an exercise

of false bravado and an expression of distaste for the tactics
employee by the police and university officials in handling the
situation.

Appellant made no move toward the street as he spoke

nor did he repeatedly urge others to action.

Dr. Thomas testified that speech often functions as a
safety valve .

Record p. 5 .

Men will be less inclined to resort

to violence if they are free to express themselves in strong
language and thereby discharge feelings of anger and frustration into
the air.

This important cathartic effect of speech has been confirmed

in psychological studies.

See Seymour Feshbs.ch, The Function of

Aggression and The Regulation of Aggressive Drive, 71 Psychological

Review 257 (1964); John W. Thibaut and John Coules, The Role of
Communication in the Reduction of Interpersonal Hostility, 47 Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 770 (1952) :

Leonard Berkowitz,

Some Factors Affecting the Reduction of Overt Hostility, 60 Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 14 (1960).

In Cohen v. California,

supra, the Supreme Court recognized the First Amendment status of
emotive speech:
[Mluch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well- In fact, words are often chosen as much
for their emot:-i.Ve as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction th~ view that the Constitution, while solicitous
of the co?!litive content of individual speech has littJ.e or
no regard for the emotive function which, prectically speaking,
may ofte-~ be the more important element of the overall
message= sought to be communicated. 11 403 U.S. at 26, 91 S.Ct .
at 17d8, 29 L.Ed.2d at 294.
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Second, the record is devoid of any evidence of appellant's
intent to incite or produce immi10.ent lawless action as required by
the Brandenburg formula.

Even i:E appellant's statement could be

construed as advocating law vioL!ttion (which alone is insufficient
to sustain a conviction), he qualified his statement with ulater" or
"again. 11

Record p. 4.

Such a qui~lification belies eny purpose to

produce imminent lawless action; it was not a call to action, but
more of an admonition to others 1to abide by the orders cf the
police on the immediate occasion..

"Later" or "again" could not,

under the circumstances, have me~:1nt

now ! 11

11

The ai)pellant' s statement

carried with it an assurance that: its message would be tempered by
the passage of time.

11
[

N] o

da!.lger flm'1ing from speech c:an be

deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
£or full discussion.a

v-n1itney v .. California, (1927) 274 U.S. 357,

377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 64~ 71 L.Ed. JL095, 1106 (Brandeis concurring).
Finally, there is no proof ,;-1hatsoever that

~

if defendant

advocated law violation, and~~ if such advocacy was directed to
inciting or producing imminent l ~n, less action, that such conduct
was likely to incite or produce ouch action .

The word "likely"

implies probability and certainl~r more than a mere tendency.
factors negating any such likeli11ood are:

(1)

The

The Sheri££ based

his arrest decision not on fear or ~pprehension of imminent lawless
action, but on the appellant's uue of a single ·word that he claimed
~as offensive to him.

Record p .. 4.

(2)

The crowd was noisy and

the appellant's words were overh~~ard only by those in the immediate
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vicinity.

Record pp. 4-5.

(3)

Persons who did overhear the

appellant did not tntGrpret his words as an exhortation to go back
into the street.

Id.

of a hostile crowd.

(4)

There was no urging or

11

stirring up"

The appellant's words ~2re never repeated.

fact> no one was paying attention to him.

In

Id.

In sum1 there is a total absence of proof as to any actual or
potential danger either intended, threatened or risked by appellant's
words.

Even applying the trial court's erroneous statement of the

law, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of disorderly conduct.
B.

There Is No Other Constitutional or Statutory Basis Upon Which

Appellantrs Conviction of Disorderly Conduct May Be Sustained.
1.

Elements of Proof Essential to a Conviction for Dis-

orderly Conduct.
To sustain a disorderly conduct conviction the State must
show (and the trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt)
that the accused:
(1) acted

(2) in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner

3]

3

It t•10uld seem that by application of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis that the broad term "disorderly" must be reed as referring to
conduct that is "loud or boisterous" in manner. This interpretation
seems to have been accepted by the Court in Whited, supra, wherein
Judge Huntert writing for the majority, omitted reference to the term
"disorderly" when stating the necessary elements of the offense:

"As indicated by the statute there must exist under the
facts of this case evidence of probative value that appellant
(1) acted in a . lcud, boisterous manner
(2) so as to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood.11

269 N.E.2d at 150.
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(3) so as to [i.e.~ causd
(4) disturb the peace and quiet of any n e ighborhood or family
(5) by
(6) loud or unusua l noise or by tucrultuous or offensive ·behavior,

threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight
' ht·i ng. 4 ]
or £ ig

The gravamen of the offense is the disturbance of the peace
and quiet of a neighborhood or family.

667, 671, 64 N.E.2d 22, 23 (1945).

Romarv v. St.ate, 223 Ind.

In Whited, this Court 2dded a

judicial gloss explaining t he harm contemplated by the statute
ruling that proof of loud, boisterous conduct ''whi ch

EX

its nature

is offensive in the context in which it is cormnitted is requir~d to
support a convi ction under the statute . . . . 11 269 N.E.2d a.t 151
(emphasis by the court).

In other word s, the prosecut i.on must, at

the very least, be able to prove "that an accused's act i ons were
possessed of loud and offensive characteristics in the setting in
which they were done."

Id.

·where, as in the instant c.ase, speech

per~ is the basis for the charge and conviction, "due to First
Amendment freedoms a statute such ss the one here in question must be
read to require that any prohibite d SEP.ech related activity must be

3 cont.
A broader interpretation of 11disorderly 11 would surely rende r the
statute void for vagueness and overbreadth. See pp.
, infra.

4]
It is significant th.et i n the statement of the necessary
elements of disorderly conduce in Whiteq, ~up r a note 3, the Court
omitted any reference to tbiG l a st portion of the statute. From this
omission it may be. il1.ferred that the Court regards it as surp l usa.ge.
See Judge Prentice' dissent: 11'.fhe acts daemed obje~t:ionable !:re expressed in terms that are not ou1y overlapping, if not actually
synonymous, but also relati ve." 2.69 N.E.2d at 153 .
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proscribed bec~use it has a tend~ncy to J:.e2<! !:,_Q. violence."

269

N.E.2d at 152 (emphasis by the Court).
Applying these criteria, to sustain a conviction for disorderly conduct in the instant case the State would have had to prove
that the defendant spoke (1) in a loud n:3nn.er; (2) that his words,
in the context in which they were uttered, would have disturbed the
peace and quiet of the neighborhood eround Bryan Hall on the date
and at the time in question; (3) that such words were offensive in
the context of their use; and (4) that such words had a tendency
to lead to violence.

The necessary "clear and present danger"

caveat to this latter element has been developed in the preceding

section of this brief.

Likewise, all of the elements of disorderly

conduct must be analyzed in light of the First Amendment principles
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Cohe.n v. C;:ilif.ornia,
supra.

Insufficient evidence as to any one of t:he above listed

elements will require a Teversal of the judgment of the trial court.

It has already been demonstrated that, es a matter of law, the
State has failed to prove the fourth element noted ebove.

2.

!_he Record Is Devoid of An_y Evidence !}1at Could Serve

Fo Bring Appellant's Conduct

~i~ At~

Permissible Application o~

Section 10-1510.
The record shows that the "neighborhood" around Bryan Hall
(the nature of which this Court may take judicial notice as being
non-residential) was "disturbed" long before his utterance:

first,

by the presence of picketers and demonstrators; second, by the
arrival of a large number of police officers and Sheriff's deputies ;

third, by the gathering of 200- 300 s9~ct:ators ; fourth, by the
presence of 100-150 persous in the middle of Indtana Avenue after
the arrest of two students not connected with the appellant; and
fifth, by the verbal responses of the demonstJ:ators and spectators

as the street: tvas cleared by the Sheriff and his deputies.
pp. 3-5.

Record

It was in this context that Hess uttered the phrase "We'll

take the fucking street later [or again] . 11

The words were spoken in

a loud voice, but no louder than many other. voices in the crowd
of 200-300 persons.
a.

Defendant Was N11t Loud Within the Meani~ of Section

10-1510.
The word "loud" as used in the statute must be inter-

preted with reference to t11e circumstances.

A crmid at a footbell

game and many other public gatheringo certainly can be termed :iloud, 11

but an individual who seeks to yell above the general noise level of
such a crowd may even be reGarded l'1i th favor by ot:hers for his
vocel support of his team or his candidate .

Obvi ously the mere

£act that appellant spoke loudly while others too l'1ere speaking
loudly is not sufficient to fc,:m
b.

th<:i

The Ne.ighborhoo~

basis for his conviction.

wa~

There was considerable

_!ot Disturbed~ Appellant's Words.

11

disturbance 11 of the neighborhood

well before appellant's utterance, and which was caused by no activity
of his.

In Whited, this Court upheld the disorderly conduct convic-

tion of a person who loudly thrust: VP.:rbal epithets at police officers

who had come to his home to conduct a search.
significant that

The Court found it

"This conduct cccurred in an area of residences that
prior to ~uch acts had from all that is in the record, been
devoted to normal ~n-i usu.:,1 urbr.n pursuit.o. The mood that
existe<! ~ broken. 11 269 N .E .2d at 151 (emphasis supplied) .
Here, of course, appellant ' s ut:!:erence was fully consistent with
the existing mood, and had no additional disturbing effect upon the
neighborhood.

Therefore, a finding of the harm contemplated by the

statute ( i.e. , t he actual or probable disturbsnce of a neighborhood)
is not established by the evidence.
c.

Appellant's

~d~ ~~ No~

Offensive in the pontext

_in !·Jhich They Were Uttered.
Sheriff Thra~her mace it clear tha t it was not the
volume of defendant's utterance that he con:3idered offensive, but
the content, i.e ., the use of the word "fuck 11 as a single expletive
or the word "fucking 11 e.s a modifier.

He c~rtainly did not perceive

appellant's speech as threatening any clear and present danger of
lawless action by others in th~ crowd .
The United States Supreme Court "·ery recently has reversed
on First Amendment grounds the conviction(u~der a statute similar
\

to Section 10-151~) of a defsrridant who wore a jacket bearin.g the
words "Fuck the Draft" in the corridor of the Los Angeles Courthouse.
Cohen v . California , (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d
279.

The California courts had upheld the conviction on the ground

that such a display amounted to "offensive conduct 11 under their
statute which, as interpreted by those courts, meant ·:behavior which
has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or t o in turn
disturb the peace. rr

(Emphasis in the original.)

The Supreme Court found, first of all, that the conviction
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could not be supportetl on the basis of the state's interest in preserving the decorous atmoGhpere of tr.e courthouse.

1bere was nothiug

in the statute that would inform persons th&t, in its applications,
distinctions were to be made on the basis of. l ocaticn.

While the

expression was quite likely to have been distasteful to some of t he
persons present, the Supreme Court found thac fact insufficient to
justify curtailing 90_
~-~n' s choGen mode of expression:
"While this Court has recognized that government may ·
properly act in many Gituations to prohibit intruoion
into the privacy of tbs home of unwel<!Ome views and
ideas which cannot be totally bannad from the public
dialogue, e,. g ., B:,Q~ v. Postmaster Gene:ral, 397 U.S.
728 (1970), we have at th2 s~me time consistently stressed
that ·we are often 'captives ' outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech.
Id. at 738.
The ability of governmcmt, consonant with the Constit'l.tion,
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing
it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing th~t sub~ t i a l privacy interests ~~e being inveded i~ an ~ssentially
intolerable manner • .
While it may be tha t one has a
more substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest
when walking through a courthouse corridor than, for
example, strolling th~ough Central Park, surely it is nothing
like the interest i n being free from unwanted expressions in
t he confines of one's own home. 11 403 U.S. at 21-22, 91 S .Ct .
at 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d at 292 (emphasis supplied).
Here the State produced only the Sheriff who testified th~t
he was offended by appellant' s :.l &nguage.

In contrast, the defense

produced expert testimony as well as two college age female witnesses
who overheard the appellant and who testified that such l anguage
was not offensive in the context and in the company in which it was
used.

Certainly Sheriff Thrasher, during the performance of his

official pol ice duties, cannot assert :,a recognizable privacy interest 11
paramount to the appellant's right of free expression.
As formulated by the Court in Cohen, the issue there wa5

-28:t(t·J]hether California ca·n excise, as 1 0:cfensive conduct,'
one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discou1:se,
eit her upon the theory of tJ-ia court below that its use is
inherentl y l ik~ly to cause violent reaction or upon a more
general assertion that the States, £cting as guardians of
public moral ity, may properly remove this offensive word
from the public vor.o.bulary. 11 403 U.S. at 22, 91 S .Ct. at
1787, 29 L,Ed.2d 292.

In its decision the Court rejected both of these theories
holding that
(A1 bsent a more particularized and compelling reason
for i t s actions, t he State may not, consistently with the
First and Fourteenth .Amendments, make the simpl e public
display here involved of this single four-letter exp letive
a criminal offense, " 403 U.S. at 26 , 91 S.Ct . at 1789,
29 L.Ed .2d at 294- 93 .
11

No such 1'p~rticularized and compelling reason" has been (nor can be)
asserted here by the St ate.

It f ollows t:hat the use oft.he wcrd

"fucking" as a modifier in the sentence uttered by the e.ppel lant
cannot, in the circumstances of this cas.'.:!, sustein a <li.sorder ly
conduct conviction in light of tl,e 1·aticnale of Cohen and Whited.
As the Supreme Court noted in Cohen:
Ue cannot l ose sight of t he fact t h at , in what
otherwise might seem a tr.ifling end annoying instance of
i ndividual distasteful abuse of a privilege , . . . funda mental societal values [ achieved through the proc~ss of open
debate] are truly irr.plicated . That is why ' [ wl holly neutral
futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as
fully as to Keats ' poemG or Donne's ser mons ' • . . and why
' so l ong as the means are peaceful, the communication need
not meet standards of acceptability • . . 1 [c i tations omitted]."
403 U.S. at 25, 91 S.Ct. a~ 1788 , 29 L.Ed.2d 294.
11

As

indicated by the r ecord, the function of appellant's

language was to display his emotions a.id fee lings rather than t o
communicate ideas .

The use of emotive l anguage varies signi ficantly

wit h ethnic , c ultural, regional, social class, and age groupings.
See generally J . Hertzler,!_ Sociolog;-i of Language, Random House, 1965.

The work of a peace officer uecessc11.·i!.y cuts aci.-oss group lines and

brings him in contact wit:1 differ ent elemt?nts of the population.
That the norm:s, values, modes of expression an-1 speech of some
groups will d:lffer from his own, and on occzsion o f f end h im , may
be unfortunate .

I n a pluralistic society, hcwe.ver , t hat fac t is not

sufficient in itself to criminali ze the beh~vi or or speech in ques tion.
As the Court observed in Cohen:
"[ W] hi.le the particular f our-letter wor d being l i t i gated
here i .s perhaps more distasteful than most others of its
genre, it i s nevert h less true that cne man 's vulgarity
is a nother's lyric. I nd~ed , we think it is large ly becaus e governmental cfficials cannot make principl ed
distinctions in. t his area tha t the Constitution l eaves
mat:ter s of tas te ar,d sf:y le so largely to tha individua l.
403 U.S. at 25, 91 S .Ct. at 1788, 29 L.Ed.2d at 294.

Cohe_g ,al so precludes the State from urging that t he expression
used by the defend ant is "offensive' 1 uecausa it is obscene:
""rn1atever else may be necei-sary to give rise to the
States II broader power to p2.·ohibit obsct>1ne e,,pression, such
express i on mus t be, in some significant way, erotic . Roth v.
United States , 354 u.s. 476 (1957) . It cannot plausibly be
maint:a1.ned that this vulgar allus ion to the S2lective Service
Sys tem woul d conjure up such psychic s t imula tio n in a-,-;,yone
likely to be confront ed with Cohen ' s crudely defaced jacket.

Id. at

, 91

n. ct.

at

, 29 L.Ed.2d

In the present case it is equally implausible that anyone
overhearing the alleged remar k of the appel lant would reasonably have
understood it t o suggest se~"'t.1al i nte r course in or with, the street,
nor would pruri•ent interes ts at a ll be stimulated by the mere hearing
of the word.

The adjectiva l form of this Middle English verb is in

common usage in the United States as an intensifier and has , i n
this form , no eroti c meaning .

d.

The Evidence D~ Not Support.! Fintling !hat

Appellant 's Ste.t:ement Amounted to "Fight ing Words. :i

- 30The only r emaini ng theor.y c -;:,oa whicn ·the State may seek to

sustain this c onviction is t hat the c se oft.he word or phrase by
t he appellant c onstituted "fi ghting words 11 puni sh.;.ble under tbe
rationa l e of Chap linsky v. New H~mpsh i r e. ( 19£~2) 3 15 U.S . 568, 62
S.Ct . 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031.
Thi s approach also has been closed by the United States
Supr eme Court i n Cohen:
"Wh i le the four·· l etter word displayed by Cohen in
relation to the draft iG not uncommonly empl oyed i n a
personal l y provocative f sf:h ion, in th is instance i t: was
clearly not "directed to 'i:he perso.i of t he hear~r. "
Cantwe ll v. Connecticut, 31 0 U. S . 2 96, 309 (19l~0). No
individual actually or like l y to be i.)r es1"!nt could r~aGonably
have regarded the words or. appellant ' s jacket as a direct
personal insult . . . . There is . . • no showing t het
anyone who saw Cohen wss in f act violently arousad or that
appellant intended such ~ res ult . " 403 U.S. at 20 , 91 S .Ct.
at 1785-86 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 291.
Similarly, appellant ' s r emark clearly was not directed to the person
of t he Sherif f nor t o any ether listene1:s.

Neither did the Sheriff

interpret t he r emark as a direct insult nor could any other indivi dual reasonably have so interpreted it.

Tbe.:e was not t he slightest

proof t hat t he defendant intended or even r isked such a r esult.
Mere annoyance of the Sheri.ff .
c onvict ion .
1786,

Coates v.

29 L.Ed. 2d 291.

r,1ay

not f orm the basis of a cri minal

City of Cincinnati-. (1971) 402 U.S .2 o • _9 1 S. Ct. l'B5
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II

SECTION 10·-1510 IS UNCCNSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE BECAUSE OF

VAGUENESS AND OVERilREADTI-i
A.

General Principl ~

Appellant recognizes ths general rule that st~tutes are presumed to be constitutional and th:!?t doubts a.re to be resolved in
favor of validity.
588.

State v. ClM~!~, (1966) ?.47 Ind. 490 , 217 N. E.2d

This general rule must gi·11e way when a penal l aw cannot meat

the Constitutional requirernants ojr spccifici~y aud permissible s cope

of appl ication .

This is particularly trne tJhere, as h Gre,

faced with "the danger of tol0.rG:tfng, in the

a1:ea of Fil.·st

-;,1,a

:i-re

Amend·-

ment freedom.~ , the existen~c c f a pen~l sta tute susc~ptiblo of
sweeping and improper applicatic,n."

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, (1963)

371 U.S . l}l5, 432~33, 83 S.Ct. 328:, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405.

See generally

Amsterdam, The Vo.i.d-j:.9r-Vag11e n.ess Doctrine i n the Suoremo Co•1rt.z.

109 U. Pa. L. Rev . 67 (1960) ; Comment, The First Amen.dment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970).
The so-calle d vagueness doc trine is a combination of overlapping,
but distinct concepts ;:-eflecting d ifferent co.istit u tiona l principles,
vagueness or indefiniteness, :and overbreadth:
1.

Vagueness

The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural clue process requires fair notice
and pr oper s t andards for adjudica~ion.

The primary issues involved

are whether the provisions of a penal statute are sufficiently
definite to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to
persons who wish to avoid its penalties and to apprise judge
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and ju:ry of standards for the det-2.rmina tion of guilt .

Coates v.

City of Cincinnati, (1971) 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct . 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214;
Landry v. Daley, (1968) 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N,D . Ill.), rev'd suh
-~om.__ £!!.Other

grounds, Boy_J.e v. Lcmdry, (1971) 401 U.S . 77; Collings,

Unconstitutional Uncertainty--An Appraisal, 40 Cornell L. Rev. 195
(1955).

If the statute is so obscure that men of common intelligence

must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appl:i.cability,
it is unconstitutional.

Ba~get v. ~ullitt (1964) 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct.

1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377; Lanzetta v. New Jers~. (1939) 306 U.S. 451,

453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L . Ed . 888; Connal-I_y v. General Conetruction Co.,
(1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391, L~6 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed . 322 .

Thia Court

recently has stated the test as follows:
"[A] statute is not unconstitutional by reason of indefiniter.ess
if it is capable of intelligent construction and interpretation
by persons who possess but ordinary comprehension, if j_ts
language conveys an adequate description of the evil intended
to be prohibited."
Stanley v. State (1969),

Ind.

, 245 N.E.2d 149, 152.

But see

Grady v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, No. 1270 8294, February 10, 1972.
However, "the freedom of speech and of the press which are secured by the
First Amendment against abridgmeilt by the United States, are among the
fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all
persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State . "
Thornhill v. Alab~ma, (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 740, 84
L. Ed. 1093.

The Supreme Court cf the United States time and .:igain

has admonished state legislatures and courts that "standards of permissible statutory vagueness are st~ict in the area of. free expression."

See, e.g., Keyishi.an v. Boar.f!_~f Regents, (1967) 385 U.S.

589, 604, 87 S . Ct . 675, 684, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 .
2 . Overbreadth
In a recent case before a three judge panel in the United
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States District Court for th~ Nc:rthE:7."il District cf Illinois, Judge
Will accurately and auccinct:Iy desc:ribed the overbreadth aspect of the
void for vagueness doctrine:
"The concept of overbreadth . • . rests on principles of
substantive due process which forbid th~ prohibition of
certain individual freedom. The primary issue i:3 not reasonable notice or adequate standards, although these? issues
may be involved . Rather the i s su.e is wh9ther tbc~ language
of the statute , given its normal mecnins, iG so broad that
its sanctions may apply to conduct protected by t:ha Constitution. Frequently, t he resolution of this issu~? depends
upon whether the statute permits police and other officials
to wield unlimi ted discretionary powers in its enforcement
[ citations omittecll. I f the scope of the power pe1:mitted
these officials is so broc'ld that the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct: depends on their o"t-m r:mbjective
views as to the propriety of the conduct, the stEttute is
unconntitutional. "
Landry v . Daley, supra at 951 - 52; CcatP.s v. City of Cincinnati, supra;
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 97-98 .

See elso Couunent, 83 Harv.

L. Rev . , supra at 852 -58, and autlwrities cited therein .

3.

The Primary Vice of! yegue

£E_

O'IJ'erbx-oad _stet~ Is Its

Chilling Effect U.E_on the Exercise of First Amendment Rights.
In summary, a pena l a tat:ute is unconstitutional o;n its face
if it either (1) fails to give fair notice of what conduct i s forb i dden;

(2) invites arbitrary and disc?:"in;inat:ory law enforcement; or (3)
overreaches federally protected freedoms of speech , free movement and
assembly, Coates v. City of Cinc innati, supra. Any one or any combination of these factors i n a penal statute is sure to have a
deterrent effect beyond that necessary to fulfill a l egit:imate state
i nterest in the maintenance of public order.

Rather thm chance

prosectution, citizens will tend · to refrain from S?e.ech atnd assembly
that might come within the

embit of the statute.

Dom!:>r o~

v.

Pfister, (1965) 380 U. S . 479, 489-96, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.E<l.2d
22.

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra at 432 ·33 ; }'hornhill v.

.supra at 97-98.

Such a

11

~~ •

chilling 11 effect upon th~ exercise of these

rights is impermissible und~r the First Am~ndmeo.t, and the major
reason for invalidating a substantially overbroad law is to end its
deterrence of constitutionally p1:eferred 1:1.ctivity.

pombrowski v.

Pf ister , supra at 494- 96; N.A .A.C.P. v. But t on , supra at 437;
Thornhill v. AlabamaL supra at lOi-106.
The First Amendment was designed not only to protect the
freedoms of speech and assembly, DUt also to enccursee th~ir use.
Consequently, as with the r equirement of definiteness, the requirement of permissibly narrow s cope must be strictly obse:rved when a
stetute places any pos sible limitation upon First Amendment r ights .
Landry v. Daley, supra at 952, citing K~yishian v. Board of Regents,
supra at 603-04; Cox v. ;t.cuieia.na, (1965) 379 U.S. 536, 551-52, 85 S.Ct.

476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487; Edwards v. South Carolina, (1963) 372 U.S. 229,
237-38, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697.

Such scrutiny is necesssry to

provide a buffer between th'3 valid exercise of the police power
by the state and excessive restriction of the free dissemination of

ideas.
''These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions . . • . Because First Amendment
freedoms need breath ing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificit.y. 11
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra 371 U.S. at 433, 9 L.Ed.2d at 418.

B.

Tl.le Provisicns o f Section
------- -- ----

1.0·-1510 Are Irnpermissibly Broad.

The elements of the of:fe;:Isc cf disorc!er.J.y conduct have been
· ned ~~bov~- •

OU tll.

Supra
p.
_

,? .

--

?he
stetute consists of. a ser i es of
-

disjunct words and phrases and~ per.son may b~ found guilty of disorderly conduct in at least forty-e.igbt ~Earate ~_ll.s]

In its

bxoadest context, tha statute prescribes purr.:shment for a person
who acts in

a • . . disorde:-ly manner so as to disturb the peace

11

and quiet of a neighborhood

. by unusual noise .

. . " or who

acts in '~ . • . disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and
quiet of a neighborhood . • . by offensive beha;;ior. 116 1 There are
S]

This may be illustrated by ta.king all the disjoinad words
in the statements of the cleme::,ts of disorde rly c onduct and substituting them in sequence.
I
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

15.
16.

(manner)
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud

II

(disturb poace aud quiet· of )

family
family
neighborhood
neighborhood
family
neighborhood
family
neighborhood
family
neighborhood
family
neighborhood
family

neighborhood
family

neighborhood

offensive
offensive
offensive
offensive
offensive
offe.nsive
offenGive
offensive
offensive
offensive

III (by)

loud noise
unustal noise
loud noise
unusuG.l noise
tumultuous hehavior
tumultuous behavior
behavio.:- (threatening)
behavior (threatening)
behavior (traducing)'
behavior (traducing)
behavior (quarreling)
behavior (quarreling)
behavior {challenging to fight)
behavior (challenging to fight)
behavior (fightil1g)
behavior (fighting)

If "boisterous" and "disorderly" are substituted for "loud", the fortyeight combinations will appear. 1bis analysis assumes that the phrase
"offensive behavior" is limited to acts of "threatening, traducing,
quarreling, challenging to fight er fighting." However, this Court's
opinion in l,Jbited v. State, supra, suggests that "offensive behavior"
may have a broader meaning. 269 N.E.2d at 151. Such an inte~pretation
would increase the number of po~ential separate offenses within the
statute to fifty-one.
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no standards in the statute that would serve to protect a citizen
who in the subjective vii:,w of some pol:tr:i~man may be

disorderly"

11

because he is making "unusual noi s e · or is engaging in "offensive
behavior", even though he m::iy in f act be exercising hiG constitutional right of free spe!!ch.

CoatP.s v. City of Cincinnati, supra ;:

Terminiello v. Chicago, (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131;
cf. Grady v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, No. 1270 S294, February
10, 1972.

Indeed, this problem h2.s been r:xacer.b-ated by this Court's

holding in Whited v. St2.t:e, supr.§_--, 1·ndicating that .actual ·disturbance of a
neighborhood or family need not, be shown, but me.rely proof of conduct
which •~y its nature 1' would beve

~

disturbing effect.

The words "loud" arid "disorderly tr and the phrases "unusual
noise" and "offensive behavior;, are incapable of precise application
and. as used in the statute, furnish ready vehicles whereby legitimate
attempts freely to express and disseminate ideas may be inhibited.
Since there are no standards to guide his decision, under Section
10-1510 a policeman could determine that a person is •~oud'' or '~isorderly" because he i.s making "unusual noise" or is behaving offensively
by engaging in constitutionally protected activity such as speaking

in a public park or playing phonograph records on a public street.
Kunz v. New York~ (1951) 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280 ;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308, .60 S.Ct. 900,
84 L.Ed. 1213.

Or the policemen, es in the instant case,

may simply

6]

The statute also proscribes acting in a i:loud . . . manner
so as to disturb the peace and quiet of a neighborhood . . . by
unusual noise" or acting in a "loud. .
manner so as to disl:urb
the peace and quiet of a neighborhood .
• by offensive behavior. 11

··37be annoyed by the actions cf: the acc,.2,,11ad:
"The [ state] is fa·ee to prevent pe:ople fr.o.n blocking
sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, commiting
assaults , or engaging in countless oth~r forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so t;hrough tbe enactment a.ud
enforcement 0£ £statutes] directed ·with reasonable specificity
toward the conduct to be prohibited • • • • It cannot
constitutionally do so thr.ough the ena~tment and enforcement
of [a statute] whose violation may entirely depend upon
whether or not a policeman is ano.oyed , 0
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, (1971) 402 U.S. a-.: 614, 91 S.Ct. a.t 1688,

29 L.Ed. at 217.

Cf. Whited v. State, supra .

Moreover, public disturbance, intolerance or animosity cannot:

be the basis for abridgment of First Amendment fr~edoms of speech and
assembly.

Coates v. City of Cincili.nat:~, supra at 615, 91 S.Ct. at

1689, 29 L.Ed.2d at 218.

A legitimate exercise of free speech might

often be deemed by some persoi1s in a neighborhood to be :iloud"
or "unusual noise" or

11

offensive. 11

The statutory requirement that

such speech disturb the peace and quiet of a neighborhood or family
does not preserve its constitutionality:
"[A] function of f.:e~ speech under our system of
government is to invite dispu~e. It may well best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. ~peech is often provocative
and challen~in g . It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of sn idea. That is why freedom of
speech . • • is • • • protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shot-m lik~ly to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
and above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest . • • •
There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization
of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups."
Terminiello v. Chica.go, ( l9l}9) 337 U.s. 1, 4-5, 69 S. Ct. 894, 896 , 93
L.Ed. 1131, 1134-35 , quoted with approval in Edwards v. ~ h
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Carolina, (1963) 372 U.C. 229, •2j7 - 3~ , 83 S.CC. · 680, 9 L.Ed.2d
697, 703.

Cf. gostes v. £5=.f"::Y of Cincinna ti, ~upra at 615, 91 S. Ct.

at 1686, 29 L.Ed. at 218: "The First and the Fourteenth Amendments
do not permit a State to ma.k~

riminal tha exercise of the right of

assembly simply because its exercise may be 'snnoying ' to some
people. 1171
Certainly the facts of the instant casa illustrate that
Section 10-1510 is "susceptible of sweeping and impl·oper application,"
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83

s.c~. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d

405, 418, furnishing in its over b:readth a c onven: ent tool for "harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by prosecuti g off i cisls, against
particular groups deemed to merit their cfapleasure,"

Thornhill v.

Alabama, (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 742, 84
1100.

L.Ed.2 1093,

It invites arbitrary, autocratic 11nd harassing uses by police,

and "it i s enough [ to render it unconstitu.tional] that a vague and
broad statute leuds itself to selective enforcement against unpopular
causes. "

N,A,A.C.P. v. Button.L supra,

t 435, 83 S.C. at

9 L.Ed.2d

at l~l9.

C.

The Language of Sect~0n 10-1510 is Unconstitutionally Vague

Broad terms such as "loud " , "di.s01·derly 11 , "unusual". and
"offensive " do o.ot contain within themselves nor in the context
of their use in Section 10- 1510 sufficient notice to the citizen of

conduct to be avo ided.

See Balcer v. Binder, (1967) 274 F. Supp.

71
See also Landry v. Daley, supra, 280 F. Supp. nt 970-71 ("The
legi timate exercise of freedom of speech, press or express ior. frequently
interrupts a state of peace or quiet or interferes wii::h a planned,
ordered or regular procedure, state or habit. 11 ) .

658, 663 (W.D. Ky.).

11

No on~ may be rcquir.ed at penalf:y of life,

liberty or property to s pecu l a te as to tha meaning of penal statutes.

All are entitled to be informed as to what the Sta te commands or
forbids."

Lanzettav. l 'ew.Jers~y, (1939) 306 U.S. 451,453, 59

618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888, 890.

Also

11

s.ct.

a statute which either forbids or

requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence mus t necessarily guess st its rn~aning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process.

II

Connally v. General Construction Co., (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46
S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328.

A stat ute is a lso un:consi:itut:ionally

vague if it subjects the right of speech or assembly to a n u~uscertainable standard.

Coates v. City of Cincir.ne.ti, 1.rnpra.

The terms "loud II and "unusual noise" are synonymous ·with the
te1.-m

11

improper noise" held to rP-nder uuconstitution.~lly vague a

Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance:
The dictionary de f ines 'improper' in part as· 'not
in accordance with fact, truth or right procedure.' a□d 'not
in accord wi th propriety, r.iodesty, good taste or good manners. ,Bl
The definition of 'noise' includes 'loud, confused or sense~
leas shouting' 'sound' or a sound that lacks ag1:eeable
musical quality or is noticeably loud, harsh or discordant,'
'any sound that is unde $ired or that interferes wii!:h something to which one is listening,' or even alternatively
'sou1'l.d or a sound that is not regarded as unpleasing or
that has a pleasing melodious quality' as, for exan ple,
'the noise of heavenly choirs.'
11

The number of sounds which are constitutionally permitted
and protected and whi ch would fall within the proscription
of 'improper noise' is infinite .
Political campaigns~
8

nunusual rr is defined in Webster's Third New Inte.r·na.tional
Dictionary as follows: "[B]eing out of the ord i nary . . . devia ting
from the normal • . . being unlike others , • . . 11
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athletic events, public meetings, and a host of other
activities produce loud, confused or senseless shouting
not in accord with fac t, trut h o:e right procedure to say
nothing of not in acc:ord with proprie·t y, modesty, ·goocl
taste or good manners. The h~ppy cacophony of democr~cy
would be stilled if all 'improper no:f.ses ' in the: nurui.:tl
meaning of the term were suppressed. "
Landry v. Daley, (1968) 280 F . Supp. 968 , 970 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd sub
nom . on other grounds,
-------

Boyle v. L-a ndr.y, (1971), 401 U.S. 77. Cf.. .Edwards

v. South Carolina, (1963) 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d
697; Carmichael v. Allen (1967) 267 F. Supp. 985, 997- 99 (D.C. Ga.)
(voiding an Atlant a city ordinan~e reading:

"It shall be unlawful

for any person to act in a violent,turbulent, quarrelsome, boisterous,
indecent or disorderly manner, or to cse profane, vulgar or obscene
language, or to do anything tending to distur.b the good order,
moral s, peace or dignity of the City.")
(1968) 286 F. Supp . 830 (D.C • . Ga.).

See also Hunter v. All en,

Disorderly conduct statutes

similar to Section 10- 1510 have also been decl ared unconst itutional
ina·.number of recent cases.

Gardn.e r v. Ceci, (1970) 312 F. Supp.

516 (E.D. Wis .) ; Pr.i tikin v . Tburman, (1970) 311 F. S11pp. lliOO
(S.D. Fla.) ; The Original Fay~tte County Civic and Welfare League, Inc.
v. Ellington, (1970) 309 F. Supp . 96 (E.D. Tenn.); Li•Jingsto11 v.
Garmire, (1970) 308 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Fla.).
Given the uncertainty of the language of Section 10-1510,
and the potential for its abuse in the hsnds of authorities unconcerned with, and perhaps even hostile to the maintenance of an
atmosphere in which freedom of eh-pression can thrive, a definite
"chilling" effect results.

Rsthe:c than risk arrest nnd prosecution,

residents of this State may instead surrender through fear t heir

rights as citizens of the United Stal:es .

See Thornhill v. Alabama ,

supra at 97-98 , 60 S.Ct. at 742, 84 L. Ed. at 1100 .

Section 10- 1510

does not meet t he r equiremen t s for constitutional v a lidity.

It

i s not · "a preci se and narrowl y drawnt regulatory statute evincing
a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or
proscribed" and which i s susc eptib le of evenhanded e.pplication."
Edwards v. South Carolina , au,ora a t 236, 83 S,Ct. a t 680, 9 L.Ed.2d
at 702.
For t hese reasons the disorderly conduct s t a tute should be
declared voi d on i ts face in that it :ii.s both vag1Je and overly br oad
i n violation of the Firs t and Fourteenth Amendments to the Cons t i tution of t he United States .

III

The Form Affidavil( Employed by the State for the Initiation of

Disorderly Conduct ·Pro3e~utions .Aie. Ins<lequate to Give an Accused
Notice of the Charge Against Him.
Article 1,
alia:

§

13, of the Indiana Constitution provides, inter

"In all criminal p1:osecutions, the accused shall have the

right

to demand the uature and caus~ of the accusation against

him, and to have a copy thereof . •

"

This provision, stating

a basic principle of due process of law-that the accused shall be
given adequate notice of the charges against him~ is implemented
by IC 35-1-23-25, 35-1-23-28 (1971), Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.
(1956).

§

9-1126,91129

In Tayl2!:_ v. State, (1957) 236 Ind. 415, 418, 14.0 I-i.E .2d

104 , 106 this Court observed:
[1J t is the well established rule in this State that the
par ticular crime with which the defendant is charged mus t
be shown with s uch reasonable certainty, by express averm.e uts
as will enable the court ai1d jury to distinctly understand
what is to be tried and determined, and to fully inform
the defendant of the pgrticular charge which he is required
to meet. The averments must be so clear and distinct that
there may be no difficulty in determining what evidence is
admissible thereunder . "
11

In accord are Dorsey v. State (1970)

Ind.

, 2o0 N.E .2d 800,

802 -03 : Fletcher v . State, (1961) 241 Ind. 409, 172 N.E.2d 853;
Nicholas v. State, (1960) 240 Ind. 463, 165 N.E.2d ll~9 .

And see

Loveless v. State (1960) 240 Ind. 534, 539, 166 N.E .2d 864, 866:
11

[

A] defendant is entitled to be informed specifically of the crimes

charged and not come to trial in the dark and uninformed~ S.2_ the
nature o f ~ evidence to be presented against him. "
supplied).

Cf.

(Emphasis

F.ill v. State (1968) 249 Ind. 674, 234 N.E.2d 471;

Large v. State, (1928) 200 Ind. 430 , 164 N.E. 263.

tfuile i t is conce.ded that an <iffidavit will ordinarily be
sufficient if the word,; of t:he statute c!efining the crime are followed,
the affidavit must specify 1:he particular acts performed by the
accused if the crime is defined in general terms.
State, (1932) 203 Ind. 596, 181 N.E. 512.

McNamara v.

There is certainly no

more general language to be found in the Crimhul Code than that
contained in Section 10-1510 defining disorderly conduct.
It has been demonstrated above that under the statute a person
may be found guilty of disorderly conduct in at least forty-eight
different ways.

Supra p. 35 , N. 5

Although the statute purports

to define one offense, in reality it seeks t o defiue, in broad and
vague terms, forty-eight to fifty-one ~eparate offenses.
The affidavit filed het·ein is on a printed form obviously
designed for the convenience of the State and not to give individual
defendants adequate notice of the crimes wlth which they are charged.
Indeed, the affidavit is a part of an all purpose pleading form
utilized in the

misdemeE.nor cases that make up a major portion of

t he Bloomington City Court's business.
Moreover, the State has attempted to avoid objections to its
pleading on grounds of lack of specificity insofar as the disorderly
conduct allegations are concerned by charging every defendant, re·gardless of the facts in the individual cases, with every combination
of disorderly conduct under the statute.

Record p. 1.

In fact,

the State has attempted to reduce the forty~eight different offenses
stated in Section 10-1510 to one by substituting the uord "and"
in places where the word "or= 1 appears in the s tatute.

In this

sense, the present affidavit does not even meet the test of charging

.. 44 ..
the offense in the langusge of the stctute.
thet

It is also to be noted

the affidavit here fails to ~bRrgc a n2cesoary elc~eut of the

offense-that the defendant's conduct threatened a breach of the
peace.

Uhited v. ~ ' stmra.
Because of thie method of pleading, persons facing disorderly

conduct charges are not given adequate notice of the chsrges against
them.

The string of conjunctive phrases usad to state the offense

in the "boilerplate· 1 affidavit do not reveal the real reasons for the
prosecution.

The accused is left to guess as to the nature of the

proof to be offered against him .by the State.

This point is especially

important in light of the ccnstitutione.l objections to Section 101510 developed above.

For example, the disorde~ly conduct statute

is used as a "catchall" covering everything from a street brewl
to incurring the displeasure of some police officer for exercisicg
rights under the First Amendment.

This Court should be on constant

guard against the dangerous s.buses of its p1·ocess that are all too
possible and tempting under a statute such as Section 10-1510.

Only drunkenness arrests annually outnumber arrests for disorderly conduct.

FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1970, p. 119 (of the

total estimated arrests for 1970, 1,825,500 were for drunkenness;
710,000 were for disorderly conduct).

It would be safe to assume

that a similar pattern holds true in Indiana.
Many persons charged with disorderly conduct via the boilerplate affidavit appear without counsel, and in many instances plead
guilty because the fine and costs imposed are likely to be less
than the expenditure required to employ counsel to present what could

be a valid -,'. e :~er~::f~1 ,or.:·0Lject'ion: Cu t~1e cb.u:.::g~.

Only

H:

·ex-a.ct riah.ire· of·' 'd ie·-- ·co'r~ducF·'~ll~ged 'to '" lte; di19'o:;:de-r"ly• is

the
set f~rth in the

State's pleading will a court be able to protect citizens against ,
the deprivation of their constitutional rights by the police and
prosecuting authorities.
It is especially important that this Court arti.cu.late clear

standards for the lower courts to follow in evaluating the State's
pleadings in disorderly conduct cases so as tc protect these rights.
Thousands of disorderly conduct cases are processed annually in
Indiana.

Many of the defects in p1·oced1.1re ai,d substance that have

been brought to this Court's attention in the instant case affect
the validity of countless 0th€= cases.

Such defects that may

exist usually go unchallenged because of. the defendants' lack of

resources.

It should be of some concarn to this Court t:hat out of

the thousands of disorderly conduct convictions that must have

resulted in the 29 ~year life of Sec·t ion 10-1510, less than half a
dozen cases have been bro .1ght: here for review.
1

Such a history

must have left in its wake an important group of citizen whose
perception of the criminal prcce::;s cannot reflect the image of
fairness and rational treatm~nt supposed in theory.

Individually,

the cases may seem insignificant, but collectively they represent
a severe qualitative and quantitative strain on the process.

See

generally Foote, Vagrancy-type Law and its Administration, lOlJ. U', ·,·Pa.
L. Rev. 603 ( 19 56) ; Katz• Municipal Courts : Another Urban Ill, 2 0

Case W. Res. L. Rev. 87 (1968).

The vague "boilerplat,~ 11 pleadings utilized by the State for

the initiation of disorderly conduct prosecutions also hide the

fact that such ceses are usually initiated with no prosecutorial
screening.

Illegal arrests and unlawful applications of the statute

are easily masked by the type of: affidavit here employed.

If

this Court were to require that the lower courts insist upon proper
pleadings in these case~-that is, pleadings that would truly discharge their notice-g:i.ving function-it would afford some essurance
that persons would be prosecuted for disorderly conduct only when
there is good csuse to belieVe th~y have actually committed an offense.
As matters now stand, the State does not bother to respond
seriously to defendants' arguments such as those asserted by the
appellant throughout this case.

The prosecutor's inaction reflects

an expectation that lower courts "1111 not c1eriously consider
arguments attacking "business as usual n methods, or invoking ccnstitutional considerations on behalf of a person accused of disorderly conduct.

However, a defendant ou-ght::;ndie :t,e,)"E;::u,h:j.e.1:/tttd u-61°:>che

time consuming and expensive process of appeal to obtain the first
serious consideration of his cleim.

Most people will have neither

t he stamina nor the financial resources to survive such a process.
CONCLUSION
The appellant.' s conviction should be reversed and he should
be ordered discharged on the grounds that (1) Section 10-1510 was
applied unconstitutionally to him; (2) the evidence was insufficient
to support a conviction under Section 10-1510; (3) Section 10··1510
in unconstitutional on its face.

In the alternative, the Court

should reverse and remand the cause to the trial court on the ground
that the State's pleading was insufficient as a matter of law.

If

-47such a course is chosen, the Court should accompany its order with
clear guidelines for the drafting of affidavits in future cases
arising under Section 10 -1510.
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